1.  How Does the International Community Reinforce Divisions Between Groups?

One of the most noted psychological symptoms among the Muslim population in Sarajevo during the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was its total puzzlement about that the Muslim community was stereotyped as Muslim fundamentalists by a Western perception. ^[1]   This perception caused such traumatic stress that people sought psychological help since they did not recognize themselves in that definition, which also has to be understood in the context of the Muslim community not seeing themselves as being able to properly defend themselves. ^[2]

This paper raises the issue that there is an interactive dynamic between the internal and external (international) actors that risks reinforce the boundaries between groups if certain perceptions are unequivocally accepted regarding who people are in terms of ethnicity and group belonging, and in the anticipation of how people will behave. There are consequences of such perceptions since policies and expectations are based upon them. International actors need to become aware of that dynamic so that in an effort to assist in conflict resolution and peace-building the divisions that do exist do not get cemented and reinforced, or are seen as something given. In addition we need to understand the necessity for actors not only at the governmental level but also at the community level to become engaged in the peace process. This is necessary to consider since it relates to who defines the issues at hand, how these issues are addressed and which issues the different actors are ready to deal with. To focus only at the governmental level keeps us within the realm of the political dimension both with regards to internal and international actors, while we simultaneously need to understand and identify other dimensions of conflict that interrelate with one another. We need to develop such an integrated approach, because if properly applied and understood, it will ultimately lead to the prevention of conflict.

2.  Elite-Driven Conflicts and the Process of Polarization Between Groups

The elite-driven conflicts that evolved in Rwanda and Bosnia-Hercegovina were driven by actors that used and manipulated members of the population to carry out violent acts based on ethnicity, and where in numerous cases former friends and neighbors turned into enemies. Maynard terms these types of conflicts, identity conflicts. ^[3] These are conflicts among identity groups based on factors such as ethnicity or religion, and are characterized by their intense animosity, extreme brutality and widespread involvement by civilian actors in the context of societal collapse. ^[4]

The increasing animosity and the resort to violence between groups has traditionally been explained by the process of polarization. The process of polarization involves the element of mutuality, in that members of the different groups are brought together into hostile blocs that equally oppose each other. ^[5] Conflicts over certain events and issues increase, as does the simplification of issues. The middle ground and the mediating structures and relationships diminish. ^[6] Ideologies of polarization develop preconceiving the society in simplified terms, where the different groups have neither any common nor reconcilable interests. ^[7] As tensions arise, this dynamic leads to that violence becomes unavoidable as well as reciprocal.^[8] Violence is met by violence with an accompanied spiral effect on the polarization. The ensuing violence has a direct deteriorating effect on the relations both among and between the different groups, and on the relations between the groups and the government. While continuous violence leads to an even higher degree of polarization, extreme violence such as genocide, transforms the conflict into relations of mutual hatred. ^[9] The necessity for violence is explained and justified by the different actors as either that violence is the only available alternative to incur changes in the system for the sub-ordinate group, or as the only alternative to defend and maintain the existing system from any changes from the perspective of the dominant group. ^[10]

However, we also know of numerous cases where people refuse to participate in this process of polarization and manipulation. In Rwanda, where a well-planned strategy of genocide of the Tutsi population existed long before it was carried out, moderate Hutu were targeted and killed because they were for mutual coexistence and political participation of all groups. ^[11] Many Hutu were not only victims of the violence that ensued, but did also help assist and protect members of the Tutsi group. Also in Bosnia-Hercegovina many people have helped and protected each other across ethnic lines, and have not succumbed to the polarization that has ensued. In Burundi, there are many examples of where people have not followed different leaders’ incitement to violence. ^[12]

The complexity of the situation is reflected in that while some people have not necessarily seen themselves defined by a certain group membership, the ensuing polarization has at times forced people into accepting that identification because of the need of protection from the very real threat from actors that label people according to a specific group and act thereafter. As the example from Sarajevo on page one shows, there is here an interrelated dynamic with international actors that can serve to reinforce this identification with painful consequences.

In addition, in many places where violence has erupted, former existing local or traditional social networks like elders’ councils have ceased to function because people simply feel overwhelmed by the situation and the escalating animosity. ^[13] There are times when it is very difficult to separate what is right from wrong and to withstand the dynamics of polarization and violence. It would be useful for international actors to try to consciously identify such networks or councils to support them in conflict situations, with the purpose of reducing fear and mistrust and of trying to mitigate the ensuing polarization. In Burundi, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as part of its dissemination program on norms of humanitarian conduct identified and organized a local working group whose members resisted the conflict, and is an example of how international actors can assist in mitigating tensions between groups. ^[14] In addition, the ICRC redesigned its program to reduce the risk that the program itself would feed into suspicions between the groups.

3.   How Do We Refrain From Feeding Into the Process of Polarization?

From the perspective of the various international actors, it is necessary to try to identify the dynamics of violence to be able to understand why people act in a certain way, and also to reduce the risk for international actors to become emerged into the process of polarization.

The foundation of ethnocentrism and nationalism is said to be the affiliation people feel with what is termed the ‘in-group’ and the fear of the ‘out-group’. ^[15] In times of societal transition and disintegration feelings of insecurity and the fear for the unknown make us more susceptible to messages of fear or propaganda especially if these sentiments are combined with actions that validate this fear. These feelings of insecurity and the fear for the unknown do not emanate from being a member of a certain group, race or nation, but emanate from being a human being. ^[16] It is in the context of certain circumstances, such as societal transition and disintegration, that in addition, also ordinarily psychologically healthy people can become prone to fuel their feelings and frustrations into hatred of the ‘other’ followed by violence. ^[17] The ‘other’ becomes the enemy. These acts of violence no longer remain private acts of violence if spurred on or incited by actors with a political purpose that use, in this case, ethnicity as a means to get to or to stay in power. What such actors, leaders, provide is a very powerful validation of not only the distress and the fear that people are experiencing, but of who the enemy is. ^[18] Becoming aware of this dynamic and understanding how powerful it is, provide an opportunity for international actors to try find a mechanism to mitigate the effects of such fears before violence erupts instead of risk believing that the eruption of violence might be something given.

Political violence by one group against another has serious consequences for how the different groups view and relate to each other. It has been said that such violence leads to that the boundaries between the groups become reinforced, as does the internal cohesion for each group. ^[19] Also, violence leads to the strengthening of the inclination of stereotyping the other group, the ‘out-group’, as the enemy, all combined leading to that the gap between the groups widens. ^[20] The concept of the enemy, also supports the internal cohesion of the group. ^[21] An additional factor is the dehumanization of the ‘other’ which makes it possible for a person to carry out violent acts.

However, it would be a mistake to take this dynamic as something static. As an example, local non-governmental organizations (Ngos) working in Sarajevo which provided emergency aid to war victims during the conflict, had been established by the specific groups, Serbs, Muslim, Catholic and Jewish before the conflict erupted in 1992 serving not only the specific groups but the whole community in areas where they worked based on need. ^[22] When the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina began, these local Ngos were identified by international Ngos as their partners and as recipients of funding. However, as a way of showing nonpartisanship some of these international Ngos targeted their funding to each Ngo based on specific group ethnicity. Later on representatives of these local Ngos have argued that by targeting aid in this way the international actors reinforced the divisions that existed, while not creating them. ^[23] They also suggested that if these funds had been given to them as a group to jointly decide where to allocate them, joint decision making as well as a mutual understanding of each other’s suffering would have been strengthened. ^[24] Such an approach would also have been able to serve as a common ground for continuous joint decision making in the post conflict phase.

This example not only shows the problem with uncritically accepting definitions and perceptions about how one thinks the situation is. It also shows the necessity for international actors to become more adept at analyzing the different dynamics of a certain situation and to take responsibility for the fact that what one does has an impact on people and that these actions always have consequences, good or bad. It also reflects the necessity for developing true partnerships where concerns such as these would have been aired and taken into account at the time of the planning of, in this above-mentioned case, the funding of local Ngos.

4.  The Necessity to Let Go of the Enemy – From Simplicity to Complexity

In countries where neighbors and former friends turn into foes as we have seen in so many places, an examination of also the psychological dimension of conflict resolution is required. ^[25] This is necessary when the situation is highly emotionally charged affecting among other things not only how people perceive and relate to each other, but also how people perceive the deliverance of emergency aid and assistance, as well as governmental and international initiatives and projects for reconstruction and development. It is both very difficult and painful to let go of the ‘us-versus-them’ attitude, especially in the context of continuous political polarization. In moving towards a more peaceful society away from the polarization, letting go of the ‘enemy’ is though a necessary process as is letting in a more complex reality. Fear is a very powerful emotion that does not go away with a peace agreement. This psychological dynamic needs to be properly understood as well as addressed. For instance, some of the resistance in Bosnia-Hercegovina regarding the difficulties people still have in being able to move back into their own houses, might be based in continuous fear and not hatred for the other. ^[26] This has to be seen in the context of what kind of leadership that is present. Also, again it is a matter for international actors, at this cross-point, to try not to feed into and thus maintain existing divisions but instead try to assist in finding ways and mechanisms for moving away from the polarization. Because of the complexity of the situation this needs to be seen in the context of the interrelationship between not only governmental and non-governmental actors, but also between the different dimensions of conflict.

Another aspect is that in a highly emotionally charged environment it is easy to lose perspective because of the mere emotional difficulty of the situation, and some international actors might easily become a target for manipulation if they are not adept at dealing with emotional issues. For instance while the need to defend and protect a group, people, is justified, there is a risk such as the case of Rwanda shows that the situation turns into a power play. In Rwanda, governmental actions, domestically and internationally such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are explained by the government within the framework of the genocide, and the genocide is used as a justification for disproportionate violence. Some international actors have dismissed or minimized actions taken by the current government, in some cases because of an ineptitude to deal with the highly emotionally charged environment after the genocide. ^[27] Still it is well documented that for instance both sides have committed crimes against humanity during the conflict in 1994. ^[28] Also, that soldiers of the RPA (the Rwandan Patriotic Army) have been responsible for massacres of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as for killings and “disappearances” of civilians in Rwanda. ^[29]

An approach that dismisses and minimizes actions taken by actors that surmount to violations of international humanitarian law or human rights will not lead to peace, because it does not support the dynamic that is conducive to peace. It is a confusing approach since these external actors do not seem to be able to distinguish between right from wrong at a time when clarity is needed. International actors have to make sure that their activities support the country as a whole for the long-term, and not only those who find themselves in a leadership position at a certain time. Also, such an approach only serves to maintain animosity and division as well as impunity.

The complexity of the concept of ethnicity is reflected in conflict situations by the relocation or reintegration of people. Many people have been forced to relocate because of their ethnicity to not only new areas but what has become a new country, in the context of nation transformation. Others have been living in exile during decades, and later return to their former home country. Ethnic affiliation with other people of the same group in this new place might not necessarily lead to being in a more tolerant environment, or at home. Different experiences as well as lifestyles, and issues such as land distribution and who gets assistance, transcend ethnicity. ^[30] A too a narrow focus on ethnicity risks disregard the underlying root causes of conflict that might still be present, such as continuous political and economic discrimination. Again in Bosnia-Hercegovina, some people have argued whether the international community in its quest to end the conflict, paradoxically has been working towards division and not unity. We do not need to create a new lid, here ethnicity, to put on existing problems by not adequately addressing the root causes as well as the consequences of conflict.

A related example is Rwanda after the genocide in 1994. Hundreds of thousand of Tutsi returned from having lived in exile during decades in mainly English speaking Uganda or in French speaking Burundi. ^[31] Some of these people have never even been to French speaking Rwanda before, or they left Rwanda when they were small children. ^[32] This situation is reflected at the governmental level as well, where the initial opposition group of exile-Tutsi constitutes the core of the current government. Today some of those Hutu and Tutsi that lived in Rwanda throughout the genocide and never fled have at times more in common with each other than with their respective ethnic group. ^[33] Also, concerns about whose interest the government is serving have been discussed, an issue which transcends ethnicity. This has to be seen in the context of that the current government has long been criticized of limiting political opposition of all groups, that political space has been seriously curtailed, and that it is controlling, not governing, the country. ^[34] In April 2000, tensions increased once again when key Hutu members of the government resigned, leading to that some people fled to Tanzania. ^[35] Since April 2000 there has been what the UNHCR (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) terms a “worrying” increase of Rwandan refugees into Tanzania. ^[36] The refugees give as reasons to their flight among other things, an increase in disappearances, arbitrary arrests and killings targeting young men in particular. ^[37] The situation is exacerbated in Rwanda by that a common definition of either the past or the current situation, including the historical aspect, does not seem to have yet fully developed neither internally nor internationally. This is serious because that means that some of the post-conflict projects and programs might have been or be counter-productive for the development of peace.

An integrated approach is necessary because a too a simplistic approach will not only limit the scope of issues that will be addressed, but also the number of actors involved in the making of peace. As this paper has shown there are many dimensions to a conflict situation. In recent conflicts there has been a clear gender dimension, where many women and girls have been exposed to rape and sexual violence as a deliberate method of intimidation. Such violence is not separated from the general social structure of our societies that includes the role of women, and that dimension needs to be included and not only framed in terms of crimes having been committed against women. Finally a simplistic approach will serve to maintain the polarization that already exists instead of help reducing it, with the result of continuous division.

In conclusion, international actors in conflict or post-conflict situations, be it through emergency aid or funding of and participation in different projects and programs with the stated purpose of contributing to peace, need to become aware of the interrelationship between these different dynamics and dimensions so to make sure that peace is not built on division and on what separates people, but on how we can create a mutual platform from where to start living together again.

September 2000.

Bibliography

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^[1] Jones, Lynne, ‘Letter from Sarajevo: On a front line’, BMJ 1995; 310:1052-1054 (22 April), 1052, p. 1

^[2] Op. cit., p. 5

^[3] Maynard, Kimberly A., ‘Healing Communities in Conflict, International Assistance in Complex Emergencies’, 1999, p. 6

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] Kuper, Leo, ‘The Pity of it All: Polarization of Racial and Ethnic Relations’, 1977, p. 128

^[6] Op. cit., p. 113

^[7] Op. cit., p. 128

^[8] Op. cit., p. 128

^[9] Op. cit., 1977, p. 205; Kuper talks about how the conflict in Burundi became ‘qualitatively’ transformed by violence, such as that extreme forms of violence did not only have a deteriorating effect on relations, but an effect that evolved from deteriorated relations into hatred of each other.

^[10] Op. cit., 1977, p. 114, 120

^[11]   Two to three years before the Arusha Accords in 1993, there was the beginning of a movement in Rwanda working for the respect for human rights, the rule of law and an end to the one-party system. Many Hutu publicly were in favor of democratic governance and negotiating with the RPF (the Rwandan Patriotic Front) leading up to the Arusha Peace Accords in 1993. These were seen by the Hutu extremists as traitors and labeled “accomplices” of the RPF, and were intimidated and terrorized along the Tutsi by the different militia groups the Interhamwe and the Impuzamugambi, the youth wings of the Hutu parties the Movement Republican national for development (MRND) and the extremist the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR); Destexhe, A., ‘Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century’, 1995, p. 28-29:

^[12] Anderson, Mary B., ‘Do No Harm: how aid can support peace – or war’, 1999, p. 117

^[13] Maynard, Kimberly A., ‘Healing Communities in Conflict’, 1999, p. 116

^[14] Anderson, Mary B., ‘Do No Harm: how aid can support peace – or war’, 1999, p. 117

^[15] Robins, R. S. and Post, J. M., ‘Political Paranoia, the Psychopolitics of Hatred’, 1997, p. 88

^[16] Op. cit., p. 89

^[17] Op. cit., p. 89, 93, 97

^[18] Op. cit., p. 94, 97: However, at the bottom of such movements are people who are not content with themselves, p. 97.

^[19] Crenshaw, Martha, ‘Intro.: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism’, in ‘Terrorism, Legitimacy…’, p. 22

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Robins R. S. and Post J. M., ‘Political Paranoia, the Psychopolitics of Hatred’, 1997, p. 92

^[22] Anderson, Mary B., ‘Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War’, 1999, p. 35

^[23] Ibid.

^[24] Ibid.

^[25] See the developing literature on the necessity to integrate both psychological and social issues into the international response and assistance regarding complex emergencies, Maynard, Kimberly A., Rebuilding Community: Psychosocial Healing, Reintegration, and Reconciliation at the Grassroots Level, in ‘Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance’, Ed. by Kumar, Krishna, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., London, 1996, Boulder, 1997

^[26] A majority of the 660.000 Bosnians that have returned to Bosnia have not been able to return to their old homes because of continuous political tension between the different communities (Serb, Muslim, Croat). In addition one million more Bosnian refugees and internally displaced persons have yet to permanently settle.  Some improvements have been made such as setting up a legal framework that includes property laws, that the UNCHR tries to strictly implement: UNCHR – The World, South-East Europe pages – Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 2000, http://www.unhcr.ch

^[27] An ineptitude to deal with the emotional environment in Rwanda is by no means the only reason to why international actors dismiss or minimize these actions, but a reason that is seldom acknowledged.

^[28] Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the final report of the Commission of Experts, S/1994/1405, December 9, 1994, in ‘the United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996’, the Blue Books Series, Volume X, p. 416

^[29] Commission Internationale Non-Gouvernementale, 1998; Frøyland A., Nilsson A-C, Suhrke, ‘Rwanda: Verken rettferdighet eller fred’, in ‘Forsoning eller rettferdighet? …’, 1998, p. 275; Amnesty International: “Rwanda, the Hidden Violence: “disappearances” and killings continue”, June 23, 1998, AFR 47/23/98: Annual Report 2000; www.amnesty.org

^[30] U.S. Committee for Refugees, ‘Life After Death: suspicion and reintegration in post-genocide Rwanda’, February 1998, p. 12-13; Maynard, Kimberly A., ‘Healing Communities in Conflict’, 1999, p. 116

^[31] U.S. Committee for Refugees, ‘Life After Death: suspicion and reintegration…’, February 1998, p. 12-13;

^[32] While today the official languages in Rwanda are Kinyarwanda, French and English, the main languages spoken have been Kinyarwanda and French.

^[33] U.S. Committee for Refugees, ‘Life After Death: suspicion and reintegration ...’, February 1998, p. 12-13

^[34] See Prunier, Gérard, ‘Rwanda: La mort d’un juste’, Libération, Débats, June 16, 1998, Le Quotidién, www. Libération. com; Reyntjens, Filip, ‘Talking or Fighting? Political Evolution in Rwanda and Burundi, 1998-1999’, Current African Issues, No.21, 1999, p. 26

^[35] UNHCR Press Briefing Note, April 28, 2000, ‘Tanzania: UNHCR concern at nine accounts’, www. UNHCR Refugee NewsNet: in the first half of April 2000, more than 160 Rwandans fled to Tanzania.

^[36] UNHCR Press Briefing Note, July 21, 2000, ‘Tanzania: Increase in Rwandan arrivals in Ngara’, www. UNHCR Refugee NewsNet:

^[37] UNHCR Press Briefing Note, July 21, 2000, ‘Tanzania: Increase in Rwandan arrivals in Ngara’, www. UNHCR Refugee NewsNet: By July 2000, 3.240 people have fled from Rwanda to Tanzania this year alone. For the whole of 1999, UNHCR recorded 1,633 people.